

## **MARK SCHEME for the May/June 2014 series**

### **9697 HISTORY**

**9697/33**

Paper 3 (International History), maximum raw mark 100

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

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Page 2	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

### GENERIC MARK BANDS FOR ESSAY QUESTIONS

Examiners will assess which Level of Response best reflects most of the answer. An answer will be required to demonstrate all of the descriptions in a particular Level to qualify for a Mark Band. In bands of 3 marks, examiners will normally award the middle mark, moderating it up or down according to the particular qualities of the answer. In bands of 2 marks, examiners should award the lower mark if an answer just deserves the band and the higher mark if the answer clearly deserves the band.

Band	Marks	Levels of Response
1	22–25	<i>The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. Essays will be fully relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by very appropriate factual material and ideas. The writing will be accurate. At the lower end of the band, there may be some weaker sections but the overall quality will show that the candidate is in control of the argument. The best answers must be awarded 25 marks.</i>
2	18–20	<i>Essays will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. The answer will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The impression will be that a good solid answer has been provided.</i>
3	16–17	<i>Essays will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The answer will be largely relevant. Essays will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. Most of the answer will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence.</i>
4	14–15	<i>Essays will indicate attempts to argue relevantly although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis or explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively.</i>
5	11–13	<i>Essays will offer some appropriate elements but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis and the quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be linked effectively to the argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the answer will be unbalanced.</i>
6	8–10	<i>Essays will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question.</i>

<b>Page 3</b>	<b>Mark Scheme</b>	<b>Syllabus</b>
	<b>GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014</b>	<b>9697</b>

7	0–7	<i>Essays will be characterised by significant irrelevance or arguments that do not begin to make significant points. The answers may be largely fragmented and incoherent. Marks at the bottom of this Band will be given very rarely because even the most wayward and fragmentary answers usually make at least a few valid points.</i>
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Page 4	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

### SPECIFIC MARKING INSTRUCTIONS

#### SECTION A

1. **Source-based question: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONGO CRISIS 1960–1: ‘UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld acted in an impartial manner throughout the Congo crisis of 1960-1.’ How far do Sources A-E support this view?**

**L1 WRITES ABOUT THE HYPOTHESIS, NO VALID USE OF SOURCES**

These answers will write about the Congo crisis and might use the sources. However, candidates will not use the sources as information/evidence to test the given hypothesis. If sources are used, it will be to support an essay-style answer to the question.

**L2 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM THE SOURCES TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS**

These answers use the sources as information rather than as evidence, i.e. sources are used at face value only with no evaluation/interpretation in context.

**L3 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM SOURCES TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS**

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves both attempting to confirm and to disprove it. However, sources are still used only at face value.

**L4 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS**

These answers are capable of using sources as evidence, i.e. demonstrating their utility in testing the hypothesis, by interpreting them in their historical context, i.e. not simply accepting them at their face value.

**L5 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS**

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves attempting both to confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis, and are capable of using sources as evidence to do this (i.e. both confirmation and disconfirmation are done at this level).

**L6 AS L5, PLUS EITHER (a) EXPLAINS WHY EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE/SUPPORT IS BETTER/PREFERRED, OR (b) RECONCILES/EXPLAINS PROBLEMS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT NEITHER CHALLENGE NOR SUPPORT IS TO BE PREFERRED**

For (a) the argument must be that the evidence for agreeing/disagreeing is better/preferred. This must involve a comparative judgement, i.e. not just why some evidence is better, but also why other evidence is worse.

For (b) include all L5 answers which use the evidence to **modify** the hypothesis (rather than simply seeking to support/contradict) in order to improve it.

**Context:** In June 1960, Belgium, somewhat reluctantly, granted independence to the Congo. The Congo faced a number of problems, e.g.

- the Belgians had done very little to prepare the Congo for self-governance. Its people had no experience of running democratic institutions.

Page 5	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

- The Congolese were split by various political and tribal differences. Kasavubu and Lumumba had been, and would continue to be, political rivals.
- Belgium and other western countries had significant economic interests in the Congo, which they were determined to continue post-independence.
- Katanga province was one of the wealthiest areas within the Congo. Its secession denied the Congo 60% of its revenue. Hence Lumumba's determination to ensure that it was returned to the control of his government.
- Lumumba was erratic – in addition to seeking help from the UN, he had also asked for assistance from both the USA and the USSR. Once it was clear that the UN was not going to support his military quest to end the secession of Katanga, he became increasingly reliant on Soviet support (weapons, advisers etc.)
- The Congo was thus threatened by cold war rivalries. The same could be said of all of the recently independent African countries.

When Lumumba sought UN assistance in removing Belgian troops from the Congo, Hammarskjöld took the matter to the Security Council (the first time a Secretary-General had taken this course of action). That the Security Council agreed on UN involvement in the Congo was itself surprising, given the fact that any of its members could have deployed the veto. However, its resolution was (perhaps inevitably) rather vague and open to different interpretations. Lumumba believed that the UN troops would fight alongside his own in order to end the secession of Katanga. Hammarskjöld refused to allow this, believing that such a course of action would be in breach of the UN Charter. Hammarskjöld's approach was to negotiate with the government in Katanga in order to ensure the removal of Belgian troops – Lumumba saw this as unwarranted UN interference in an internal Congolese dispute and not in line with the UN Security Council resolution.

By the time of his own death in 1961 (in a plane crash whilst travelling to negotiate with the leader of the Katangan government), Hammarskjöld's attempts to preserve peace in the Congo were failing. He had been criticised by all sides except the leaders of newly independent countries, both in Africa and elsewhere, who saw him as the defender of their rights against big-power interference and supported him in the UN General Assembly.

### SOURCE A:

**Context:** General background information of the Congo crisis of 1960–1, provided by a Swedish historian in 2004.

**Content (Face Value):** The source states that Hammarskjöld tried to station UN peacekeeping troops in Katanga but failed. He could not take stronger action against the secession because it was an internal/constitutional matter in which the UN could/should not get involved. When President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba, Hammarskjöld tried to deal with the two factions in an impartial manner despite the fact that the USA and the USSR supported opposing sides. (**Hence Y – Hammarskjöld was trying to get a peaceful solution to the problems facing the Congo despite pressure from the superpowers**).

**Content (Beyond Face Value):** The source highlights four problems facing the Congo –

- the presence of Belgian troops who had no right to be there
- the secession of Katanga province, which PM Lumumba clearly wanted to end
- the split between Lumumba and President Kasavubu
- Cold War rivalry between the USA and the USSR, which led them to support different political factions in the Congo.

Page 6	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

The source argues that Hammarskjöld and the UN, confronted with these problems, acted impartially and in the interests of peace. In doing this, Hammarskjöld was bound to upset the parties concerned e.g.

- Lumumba wanted UN troops to assist his government in the military removal of Belgian troops and the end of the secession of Katanga. This was, indeed, his interpretation of the Security Council resolution. However, Hammarskjöld believed that he could not do this because it would constitute interference in the internal/constitutional affairs of the Congo (expressly forbidden by the UN Charter and his interpretation of the resolution). **(X-Ref with Source B)**.
- Both the USA and the USSR wanted to extend their influence in the Congo. By maintaining impartiality in the dispute between Kasavubu and Lumumba, Hammarskjöld was bound to upset both of the superpowers **(X-Ref with source C)**.

However, it should be noted that the writer of Source A is a Swedish historian. Since Hammarskjöld was Swedish, there could be an element of bias here **(Hence Y, but the reliability of the source needs to be checked against other evidence)**.

**SOURCE B:**

**Context:** Letter from Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Congo, to the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld at the height of the crisis in 1960.

**Content (Face Value):** Lumumba criticises Hammarskjöld for not assisting him to remove the rebel government of Katanga. He claims that the Security Council resolution authorised the use of UN troops for this purpose and that it was Hammarskjöld's '*personal interpretation*' which prevented this. Thus, Hammarskjöld was not following the decision made by the Security Council and was supporting Katanga separatism. **(Hence N – Hammarskjöld was intervening in an unfair way and not following the terms of the Security Council resolution)**.

**Content (Beyond Face Value):** Lumumba clearly expected that UN troops would assist his own army in ending the secession of Katanga. This is understandable since it is effectively what he asked for when he approached the UN for assistance. He clearly interpreted the Security Council resolution to mean exactly this **(X-Ref with Sources A and D)**. Instead, Hammarskjöld was clearly trying to negotiate between Lumumba's government and the rebel government of Katanga – his interpretation of the SC resolution (and the UN Charter) meaning that he could not use UN troops to intervene in an internal/constitutional Congolese matter **(X-Ref with Sources A, C and E)**. Ironically, Lumumba accuses Hammarskjöld of doing just this – intervening by trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the problem. In so doing, Lumumba claims that Hammarskjöld '*is preventing the restoration of order in the Congo*'. **(Hence N)**. This disagreement stems from the rather vague nature of the SC resolution – it would have been difficult for the Security Council to agree on this issue, given the vested interests of its members, especially the USA and the USSR. Anything too specific might have led to the veto being used, thus preventing the UN from taking any action at all. Hammarskjöld's interpretation is in line with the UN Charter (ie not intervening in the internal affairs of a country) and he was clearly trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement rather than using UN troops to support one side against another. It is, however, understandable, that Lumumba, with his own vested interest in ending the secession of Katanga, did not see it this way. **(Hence Y – Hammarskjöld was acting in an impartial manner with the aim of creating a peaceful solution to the problem. To use UN troops to help Lumumba's army put down the secession of Katanga would have been a clear intervention into an internal Congolese matter, thus breaking the terms of the UN Charter. Lumumba's views are biased)**.



Page 7	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

### SOURCE C:

**Context:** UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld addressing the Security Council at the height of the crisis in 1961.

**Content (Face Value):** Hammarskjöld claims that he and the UN have acted impartially in their dealings with Africa in general and the Congo in particular, with the main aim of preventing foreign-power intervention. He further claims that this has been successfully achieved. (**Hence Y**).

**Content (Beyond Face Value):** It is clear that Hammarskjöld's main priority was to avoid the intervention of the USA and the USSR into the Congo crisis, thus avoiding a Korean-type war being fought in the Congo (**X-Ref with Source E**). It is also clear that he saw this cold war threat in a wider context than the Congo alone – a threat to all of the newly independent African countries. He argues that avoiding this threat has been difficult and has led to him being criticised from all sides (**X-Ref with Source A**). (**Hence Y – Hammarskjöld has acted in the interests of peace and in order to avoid cold war rivalries being imposed onto the Congo**). However, it should be noted that this source is a speech from Hammarskjöld himself, and he would hardly be likely to criticise his own actions. The statement that *'in the beginning the effort was successful'* would imply that, by February 1961, this strategy was no longer successful and the cold war had become embedded into the Congo. Moreover, he admits that all sides have accused him of lacking impartiality (**Hence N**). Nevertheless, the fact that all sides were critical of his actions does, as he claims, suggest that he did, indeed, act in a neutral/objective/impartial manner. (**Hence Y on balance**).

### SOURCE D:

**Context:** A modern interpretation by a Belgian historian of the roles played in the Congo crisis 1960–1 by the UN in general and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld in particular.

**Content (Face Value):** The source is heavily critical of Hammarskjöld, claiming that he did not attempt to end the secession of Katanga, allowed the Belgians to develop their own puppet government there and then supported Kasavubu in his dismissal of Lumumba. The source also claims that Hammarskjöld did this in order to support the USA, which opposed Lumumba. (**Hence N – Hammarskjöld showed a lack of impartiality and supported the USA in his dealings with the Congo**).

**Content (Beyond Face Value):** The source claims that the UN in general and Hammarskjöld in particular were not neutral or impartial during the Congo crisis of 1960-1. The following evidence is cited –

- UN troops were not used to remove Belgian forces and end the secession of Katanga (**X-ref with Source B**).
- As a result of UN inactivity, the Belgians were able to develop a puppet government in Katanga, thus continuing their imperialistic activities. It is implicit that Hammarskjöld deliberately allowed this to happen.
- UN forces were deployed in the Congo, but not to carry out the task originally prescribed by the Security Council following Lumumba's request for assistance (**X-Ref with Source B**).
- Hammarskjöld and the UN supported Kasavubu against Lumumba, thus destroying 'Congolesse democracy'. The source claims that Hammarskjöld actually gave the 'green light' for Kasavubu's 'coup'.
- Hammarskjöld was following the wishes of the USA (implicit in this is that the UN was effectively controlled by the USA during the early 1960s).
- Hammarskjöld projected an image of neutrality, but was actually supporting the USA and opposing Lumumba, who was seen as a communist threat.

Page 8	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

- The source denies that Hammarskjöld’s main objective was to keep the cold war out of Africa. (**X-Ref with Source C**) (**Hence N**).

The fact that this source was written by a Belgian, who might be expected to support Belgian activities in the Congo, possibly gives some credence to the view expressed. However, the source is extremely opinionated and lacks substantial evidence to support its claims. For example:

- If UN troops had been used to support Lumumba’s military actions against the rebel government of Katanga and its Belgian supporters, they would have been intervening in an internal/constitutional issue (forbidden by the UN Charter).
- By negotiating with the rebel government of Katanga, it could be argued that Hammarskjöld was seeking a peaceful solution to the problem (**X-Ref with Source E**).
- This source interprets the SC resolution in the same way as Lumumba (**X-Ref with Source B**). Hammarskjöld’s interpretation was clearly different.
- No evidence is given to support the claim that Hammarskjöld gave ‘*the green light*’ for Kasavubu’s ‘*coup*’ against Lumumba. The use of the word ‘*coup*’ is itself loaded with innuendo. [In fact, under the Congolese constitution, Kasavubu had every right to do this].
- Hammarskjöld was criticised by the USA for not supporting Kasavubu (**X-Ref with Sources A and C**) which contradicts the allegations made in this source.

The source, therefore, reflects the political views of the writer and should be treated with some scepticism. (**Hence N, but source reliability is an issue**).

#### **SOURCE E:**

**Context:** A response to the allegations made in Source D by a former senior UN official, who had been Hammarskjöld’s deputy at the time of the Congo crisis in 1960–1.

**Content (Face Value):** The source argues that the UN would have been wrong to give military aid to Lumumba in his attempt to regain and maintain control of the whole of the Congo, including Katanga. Seeking a peaceful solution was a better option than taking sides in a civil war (which would have been against the terms of the SC resolution). (**Hence Y – Hammarskjöld was seeking a peaceful solution**).

**Content (Beyond Face Value):** This source is a direct response (in the same publication) to the allegations made in Source D. It dismisses Source D’s claim that Hammarskjöld favoured the USA and Belgium in his attempts to address the Congo crisis, which he correctly states was ‘*extraordinarily complex and dangerous*’. Urquhart argues that if the UN had carried out Lumumba’s wishes, it would have become directly involved in a civil war, clearly not the intentions of the Security Council. (**Hence Y**). There are two contrasting ways in which to evaluate the credibility/reliability of this source: –

- Since he was a high-ranking UN official, working extremely closely with the Secretary-General, Urquhart would clearly have had intimate knowledge of Hammarskjöld’s aims, objectives and methods. In this sense, Source E seems more credible than D.
- Conversely, it could be argued that Urquhart might be defending Hammarskjöld out of loyalty to his former ‘boss’ or in order to protect his own reputation since he would be equally implicated in any criticism of the Secretary-General.

The tone of Urquhart’s letter is extremely dismissive – e.g. describing claims that Hammarskjöld was ‘*a leading member of a neo-colonialist plot to overthrow Lumumba*’ as ‘*nonsense*’ and the flippant/sarcastic remark about the UN getting involved in a civil war in the Congo ‘*on Lumumba’s side, of course*’. He provides no real evidence to support his claim that Hammarskjöld was



Page 9	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

impartial, other than vague references to Hammarskjöld's reputation. (Hence Y, but some doubts about the reliability of the source).

**CONCLUSION:**

Sources A, C and E all state or clearly imply that Hammarskjöld's main objective was to maintain peace in the Congo, preventing a civil war which might lead to superpower involvement, thereby adding cold war rivalry to the other problems already facing the recently independent country. With this aim in mind, Hammarskjöld acted impartially, seeking a peaceful solution.

Source B accuses Hammarskjöld of failing to carry out the wishes of the Security Council, thereby '*preventing the restoration of order in the Congo*'. Source D repeats this claim, but goes further by arguing that Hammarskjöld supported the '*neo-colonialist*' ambitions of Belgium and the USA, thereby lacking the objectivity and impartiality required of a UN Secretary-General. In this, Source D is repeating the claims made at the time by the USSR.

The problems facing the Congo in 1960-1 were extremely complex. In particular, Hammarskjöld had to be mindful of the effects that cold war rivalry could have not just in the Congo, but also in the other recently independent African states.

Hammarskjöld's initial problem had been how to get the Security Council to agree to UN involvement in the Congo given the vested interests of its members. This explains why the original resolution was rather vague and open to widely differing interpretations (as clearly evidenced in sources B, C, D and E). If Hammarskjöld had interpreted the resolution in the same way as Lumumba (B) and De Witte (D), UN forces would have been used to assist Lumumba's troops in their military attempt to restore Katanga to the Congo – a clear breach of the UN Charter. Therefore, on balance, the hypothesis is supported.

Page 10	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

### SECTION B

#### 2 Analyse US President Truman’s motives for introducing the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.

The question requires candidates to display knowledge and understanding of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and to deploy this in order to analyse Truman’s motives in the light of developing cold war rivalries.

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan of 1947 formed the basis of the USA’s more hard-line response to Stalin and the perceived Soviet threat, a fundamental change from Roosevelt’s more conciliatory approach. They reflect growing public pressure in the USA following Kennan’s ‘long telegram’ and Churchill’s ‘iron curtain’ speech. They implicitly offered political and economic aid to European countries threatened by communist takeover. Truman’s motives can be interpreted in two ways –

- The view of ‘traditional’ historians is that Truman was genuinely trying to assist European nations in their attempt to recover from the devastating impact of WWII. Stalin’s aggressive and expansionist activities in Eastern Europe posed a significant threat to such countries, and Truman was determined to assist ‘free peoples’ in their struggle to resist ‘subjugation by armed minorities’ (as in Greece).
- The view of ‘revisionist’ historians is that Truman’s motives were based more on American self-interest. By this interpretation, Truman was seeking to gain control over Europe in order to exploit it for America’s own economic benefit. The Soviets, for example, referred to the Marshall Plan as ‘dollar imperialism’.

#### 3 To what extent was the globalisation of the Cold War from 1950 to 1980 caused by the Soviet Union’s determination to increase its international influence?

The question requires candidates to display knowledge and understanding of the globalisation of the Cold War from 1950-80, and to deploy this in order to evaluate the relative significance of the USSR’s attempts to increase its international influence.

In support of the view that the globalisation of the Cold War was caused by the USSR’s determination to increase its international influence, it could be argued that –

- Stalin had openly spoken of a world communist revolution
- Soviet support for the communist takeover in China
- Soviet attempts to gain greater influence within the UN (e.g. through use of the veto, by supporting newly independent states in their struggle against neo-colonialism, and by trying to secure fundamental reform of the secretariat)
- Soviet involvement in Korea, Cuba, Africa and the Middle East.

In challenging the view, it could be argued that the globalisation of the Cold War was caused by other factors, such as –

- The USA’s over-reaction to what it incorrectly perceived as a monolithic communist bloc seeking world domination, leading to policies such as containment and roll-back together with the domino theory.
- The USA’s determination to protect and enhance its own political and economic interests world-wide.
- American involvement in Korea, Vietnam, South East Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

Page 11	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

- A series of regional conflicts primarily caused by the impact of decolonisation. It is argued that the superpowers were forced to become involved in these not only to protect their own interests but also to prevent their Cold War rivals extending their own influence.

#### 4 Why was Khrushchev prepared to risk nuclear war by placing Soviet missiles in Cuba?

The question requires candidates to display knowledge and understanding of the build-up to the Cuban missile crisis, and to deploy this in order to analyse Khrushchev's motives for placing nuclear weapons on the island.

Khrushchev's motives can be interpreted in different ways –

- He was simply responding to a request from the new Cuban leader, Castro. He was genuinely trying to protect a new and vulnerable communist country which was threatened, both militarily and economically, by the USA. In order to maintain its international prestige and credibility, the USSR had to respond to such a request – the Soviet Union could then be seen as defending Cuba from American imperialism.
- He was exploiting the situation in Cuba in order to gain an advantage over the USA in their Cold War rivalry – e.g.
  - Placing missiles in Cuba would be a clear threat to the USA and would address the nuclear imbalance between the superpowers. In particular, it would counter-balance American missiles in Turkey
  - It would raise the USSR's international prestige – this would enable the USSR to gain greater influence with newly independent countries
  - It could give the USSR a foothold in the Americas, enabling communist influence to spread further
  - He was testing the resolve of a new and inexperienced American President.
- He was using the Cuban issue as a bargaining tool with the USA (e.g. to get the US missiles in Turkey removed and to gain a guarantee that the USA would not attack Cuba).
- It was a hasty, ill-judged decision; a gamble which failed and which was to lead to his own dismissal from the Soviet hierarchy and a widening of the Sino-Soviet split.

It could be argued that, in reality, Khrushchev was not risking a nuclear war at all – he knew all along that he would have to back down if his strategy failed.

#### 5 To what extent was the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1991 the result of pressure imposed upon it by the USA?

The question requires candidates to display knowledge and understanding of causes of the USSR's collapse by 1991, and to deploy this in order to evaluate the relative significance of the actions of the USA.

In support of the view that American pressure was a vital cause of the USSR's collapse, it could be argued that –

- Keeping up with the USA in the nuclear arms race had been a long-term drain on the Soviet economy.
- The USA's more aggressive approach to communism which began under Carter (1977-80) was taken further by Reagan.
- Reagan increased American spending on nuclear arms (e.g. SDI) with the aim of gaining concessions from the USSR from a position of strength.
- Reagan Doctrine – The USA assisted anti-communist movements across the world, with the aim of weakening the USSR 'at the edges'.

Page 12	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

- Reagan's approach was supported by Thatcher – provided USA with European base
- Unable to complete, Gorbachev was forced to reform, which led to the disintegration of the USSR.

In challenging the view, it could be argued that –

- The USSR's collapse was more the result of long-term economic and political stagnation.
- Soviet leaders prior to Gorbachev had been ineffective. The USSR suffered from political inertia.
- Economically, the USSR had fallen further and further behind the West and this became more evident as the mass media grew.
- The development of nationalist movements both in Eastern Europe and within the USSR itself created pressure on the Soviet leadership.
- Gorbachev's attempts to address these problems with reforms such as Glasnost and Perestroika merely split the Communist Party and encouraged greater opposition to it.
- Gorbachev's ending of the Brezhnev Doctrine enabled Eastern European states to break free of Soviet influence and gave added impetus to nationalist movements within the USSR.

**6 Assess the view that the USA maintained supremacy in the nuclear arms race throughout the 1970s.**

The question requires candidates to display knowledge and understanding of the nuclear arms race during the 1970s, and to deploy this in order to evaluate the validity of the given hypothesis.

In support of the view, it could be argued that –

- The USA developed MIRV, a missile which could carry as many as 14 separate and independently targeted warheads.
- While the USSR developed the SS20, this was not as sophisticated as MIRV and could only carry a maximum of 3 warheads.
- The USA developed cruise missiles; these were based in Europe and were able to penetrate Soviet radar by flying at low altitudes.

In challenging the view, it could be argued that –

- Gaining supremacy in the nuclear arms race had become the Soviet aim following the Cuban missile crisis. The aim was not only to enhance their own security, but also to encourage the USA to negotiate, thereby limiting or reducing the build up of nuclear weapons.
- American expenditure on the Vietnam War reduced the amount the USA could spend on nuclear development.
- By the early 1970s, the USSR had overtaken the USA and her allies in numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs.
- USSR developed ABMs, which could destroy incoming enemy missiles before they reached their targets.

A balanced response might argue that both the USA and the USSR had enough nuclear weapons during the 1970s to destroy the world several times over. Both were aware of the danger that one side might try to strike first, destroying all the other side's weapons before they had time to retaliate. Accordingly, both the USA and the USSR were determined to maintain constant technological progress. The avoidance of nuclear war depended on the maintenance of a balance of nuclear power

Page 13	Mark Scheme	Syllabus
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014	9697

**7 How far were the problems experienced by the international economy in the 1970s and early 1980s due to its over-dependence on the American economy?**

The question requires candidates to display knowledge and understanding of the problems facing the international economy during the 1970s and early 1980s, and to deploy this in order to evaluate the relative significance of dependence on the success of the US economy.

In support of the view that the problems were largely a result of dependency on the American economy, it could be argued that –

- The USA had been vital to the post WWII recovery of the international economy, as evidenced by Marshall Aid, GATT, Bretton Woods, the World Bank, IMF and the importance of the dollar.
- The USA suffered an economic downturn in the 1970s due to
  - defence costs (e.g. Vietnam War, nuclear armaments)
  - weakening of value of dollar after 1971 – effects on other currencies
  - rising oil prices (OPEC)
  - competition from Western Europe, Japan and the Asian Tigers
  - Budget deficit continued to rise, weakening the dollar further.
- The USA's economic problems were reflected in the crisis in the international economy, as evidenced by the collapse of Bretton Woods, devaluation of the dollar etc.

In challenging the view, it could be argued that there were other factors which caused problems in the international economy during the 1970s; e.g. –

- impact of the debt crisis on the developing world
- impact of the oil shocks
- impact of the growth of the Asian Tigers and the 'new' economies on the performance of more established economies.

**8 Assess the effectiveness of OPEC in the period from 1960 to 1991.**

The question requires candidates to display knowledge and understanding of OPEC in the period from 1960 to 1991, and to deploy this in order to evaluate its effectiveness.

OPEC was a cartel established in 1960 with the aim of limiting oil supplies in the hope of keeping prices high. It could be argued that –

- OPEC was ineffective during the 1960s because –
  - it controlled only 28% of the world's oil output
  - oil reserves belonged to multi-national companies
  - there was an oil glut
  - there were political divisions within the Arab world which meant that OPEC was not able to put up a united front.
- OPEC was effective during the 1970s, as evidenced by –
  - it was able to exploit the rising world demand for oil
  - it was able to negotiate new agreements with multi-national companies
  - it engineered a rise in oil prices (from \$3 to \$11.65 per barrel)
  - Arab states were able to use oil as a political weapon during the 1970s Arab-Israeli conflict
  - it was able to exploit the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war
  - OPEC's actions, as reflected in the two 'oil shocks' had a profound impact on the international economy.
- OPEC was ineffective during the 1980s because –
  - production of oil by non-OPEC countries increased (e.g. Mexico, Britain, Norway)

<b>Page 14</b>	<b>Mark Scheme</b>	<b>Syllabus</b>
	<b>GCE AS/A LEVEL – May/June 2014</b>	<b>9697</b>

- OPEC's share of world output fell by 27%
- faced with these problems, OPEC did not show a united front. While OPEC did not agree to cut prices for fear that this would undermine their whole pricing structure and devalue the economic and political gains they had made during the 1970s, its largest producer Saudi Arabia (confronted by an oil revenue drop from \$113.2 billion in 1981 to \$20 billion in 1986) cut prices in order to its maintain market share
- OPEC did have some success in the 1970s, but this was only because of favourable circumstances. As soon as these ended, the old divisions reappeared.